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Abstract - Empirical research has shown that social interactions affect the use of public benefits, thus providing 
evidence in favor of the idea of “welfare cultures.” In this paper we take the next crucial step by separately 
identifying the role of social stigma and information sharing in welfare participation, using Census data. We 
argue that the stigma vs. information distinction has possibly important consequences. Separate identification 
exploits the asymmetry between association and mere spatial proximity: we asume that while information is 
transmitted within groups, stigma works across groups as well. We also allow for heterogeneity of social effects 
across different race-ethnic groups and find non-trivial differences. We find that while the information channel is 
more important than stigma, White Americans appear to perceive stigma more from otherWhite Americans than 
by other races, and Black and Hispanic Americans appear to respond principally to stigma from external groups. 
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During the past 25 years the cost of social safety nets, broadly writ, has been
steadily increasing in OECD countries. Table 1 shows that public social expen-
diture increased by about 5 percentage points of GDP since the 1980s. Such a
dynamics has naturally generated debate on the use of welfare programs, and par-
ticularly on the demographic and social patterns of take-up rates. A range of recent
research has focused on social effects in welfare use as a possible explanation. At
the theoretical level, the idea is that interacting with people on welfare may in-
crease the likelihood of becoming welfare dependent, so that participation in social
safety nets depends not only on individual risk factors, such as being poorly edu-
cated, disabled or being a single young mother, but also on the social context. For
instance, Rege et al. (2007) ﬁnd that these peer effects explain high usage rates
for disability insurance in Scandinavia, and Bertrand et al. (2000) ﬁnd that they
account for the emergence of “welfare cultures” in the US.
In the context of this literature, two main channels of social inﬂuence have
been posited. First, being surrounded by many people receiving public assistance
decreases the embarrassment of doing likewise [Mofﬁtt (1983); Lindbeck et al.
(1999)]. This is the stigma channel. Second, people may be inﬂuenced about their
welfare choice through the receipt of information on eligibility, application proce-
dures, bureaucratic details and the like with acquaintances, as well learning from
the choices of people they interact with. This allows one to overcome information
barriers, which have been shown to prevent program participation [Heckman and
Smith (2003); Aizer (2007)]. This is the information channel. These two chan-
nels work in the same direction, i.e. predict a positive relation between the likeli-
hood of using welfare and the welfare participation rate, so it is hard to distinguish
them. On the other hand, such a distinction is important because different channels
through which social interactions operate have very different policy implications.
Yet, existing empirical work by and large bypasses the question of disentangling
these different effects.1 In this paper we aim at ﬁlling this gap, i.e. identify sep-
arately stigma and information effects in welfare participation, through a simple
general procedure.
Social psychologists have long distinguished between these two forms of so-
cial inﬂuence. Campbell and Fairey (1989), deﬁne normative social inﬂuence as
“inﬂuence to conform to the positive expectation of behavior,” and informational
social inﬂuence,a s“ i n ﬂuence to accept information obtained from another as ev-
idence about reality.” The mapping here is useful in that we can draw on decades
1AnexceptionisAizerandCurrie(2004), whouseVitalStatisticsdatafromCaliforniatoestimate
network effects in the use of public prenatal care. The authors argue that such an effect is unlikely to
be due to information sharing, but do not quantify the relative magnitude of stigma and information.
1of work in social psychology in order to understand how individuals may be using
information on others’ welfare decisions to make their own choices. Below, we
extend this parallel in justify our separation methodology.
Our strategy proceeds as follows. We use a sample of American women of
working age, from Census microdata. Reference groups are deﬁned along race-
ethnic lines at the PUMA level.2 We achieve identiﬁcation of the total social ef-
fect by isolating in our dataset a plausible individual effect whose average is not
a source of contextual effects. Such a restriction allows us to avoid the “reﬂec-
tion problem” in a clean way [see Manski (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001)].
Separation is achieved by arguing that different groups within PUMAs are asso-
ciated with different social effects.3 Speciﬁcally, we assume that information is
shared within reference groups, while stigma works both within and across groups.
In other words, while social proximity is necessary for information sharing, mere
spatial proximity is sufﬁcient for stigma.4 We discuss this assumption is greater
detail in the next Section. From a technical perspective, we simply estimate two
social effects. One of these is a race-ethnicity speciﬁc effect and the other is a
general PUMA-level effect. It is by drawing on the social psychology literature
that we propose that these effects can be labeled ‘information’ and ‘stigma’. More
discussion is found below, but henceforth, we will refer only to these labels.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the total social
effect is signiﬁcant and does not differ much across race-ethnic groups. Second,
information is the dominant social effect for Black and Hispanic Americans, but of
negligible importance for Whites. Third, to the extent that stigma matters, stigma
from one’s own group matters for White Americans but is negligible for Black
and Hispanic Americans. For Blacks and Hispanics, we ﬁnd that stigma from
other groups is instead relatively more important. The resulting social multiplier
is complex, in the sense that it results from a mixture of mechanisms that differ
across races.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate
our theoretical framework. Section 3 presents our estimation strategy. Section 4
describes the dataset. In section 5 we present and discuss our results. Section 6
concludes.
2A PUMA (Public Use Microdata Area) is an area deﬁned by the US Census Bureau, with a
minimum population of 100,000 and an average around 150,000.
3This simple method is illustrated at a general yet simple level in Cohen-Cole and Zanella (2008).
4There is evidence that preferences for redistribution and perceptions of welfare are affected by
the number of welfare recipients of one’s own race-ethicity relative to other groups at the local level
(e.g. Luttmer, 2001; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).
22 Theoretical framework
To put our model into context, we draw on the two channels of social inﬂuence
described above. Denote by π the welfare participation indicator in a static setting,
consistent with our cross-sectional dataset. A risk-neutral individual must decide
whether to work and live on labor income, in which case she does not use welfare
(π =0 ) and earns after-tax wage w, or not work and live on welfare (π =1 ), in
which case she receives a transfer T from the government. Of course T =0if the
individual in question is not eligible for welfare. The transfer is ﬁnanced by taxa-
tion, which we don’t model as we conﬁne our analysis to partial equilibrium. Each
individual belongs to a geographic community that coincides with a location  —
PUMAs in our empirical investigation—as well as to a race-ethnic group, denoted
r. The pair ( ,r) deﬁnes the individual’s reference group,o rown-group.T h a ti s ,
we incorporate a stylized fact that characterizes the American society: individuals
associate within communities mostly on a race-ethnic basis.
By construction, reference groups are non-overlapping, so for each group r we
can deﬁn eal o c a lout-group: this is the union of all other groups within the same
community, and is denoted by subscript o. Living on welfare is associated with a
participation cost, denoted by I. This is not necessarily an out-of-pocket cost: it
is a simple way to capture the role of information, including the beneﬁts of infor-
m a t i o n a ls o c i a li n ﬂuence. We deﬁne information operationally: more information
leads to a reduced participation cost. Information can be spread institutionally
(e.g. social workers in the US) or shared within reference groups deﬁn e db yt h e
pair ( ,r). In other words, while institutional information (denoted Ω ) is freely
available in each location, information sharing requires social proximity, i.e. mem-
bership in the same reference group. The assumption that information is shared
principally within race-ethnic groups, or more generally reference groups, is palat-
able to us, as well as supported by empirical evidence. In the US there is still a
considerable amount of residential stratiﬁcation along race-ethnic lines [Massey
and Denton (1993); US Census Bureau (2002)]. Furthermore, this is is associ-
ated with a tendency to interact along these same lines: a telltale sign of this phe-
nomenon is the formation of networks based on race-ethnicity at the school level
even when schools are integrated [see Moody (2001)]. As a consequence, peer-
to-peer information is more likely to be shared within but not across race-ethnic
groups. Empirical work in development economics offers numerous examples. For
instance, Romani (2003) ﬁnds that in Côte d’Ivoire information about new agri-
cultural technologies ﬂows within ethnic groups, but not across them. Similarly,
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) ﬁnd that in Mozambique farmers’ decisions to adopt a
new crop are correlated within religious groups, but not across religions. Munshi
and Myaux (2006) ﬁnd that information about contraception in rural Bangladesh is
3shared within religious group at the village level, with no cross-religion effect.5
Theprobabilitythatamemberofgroupr inlocation meetswithsomeonewho
is on welfare in the same location is equal to the welfare participation rate in the
reference group, denoted m 
r. This interpretation is possible because by deﬁnition
of social proximity she is also a member of group r – the probability of social
proximity being equal to 1 within a race-ethnic group in a given area. Therefore
m 
r is a measure of information from social contacts, and the participation cost can
be expressed as a function I
¡
Ω ,m  
r
¢
that is decreasing in both arguments.
Welfare participation leads to welfare stigma as well. Following Lindbeck et
al. (1999), this is deﬁned in a social sense as the punishment for the violation of
the social norm “everybody should live by his own work.”6 Spatial spatial prox-
imity, i.e. membership in the same community  ,i ss u f ﬁcient for this form of
social interactions: in order to feel stigmatized by somebody it is enough to feel
regarded with a negative characterization as welfare dependent. It follows from
our deﬁnitions that social proximity implies spatial proximity but the reverse is
not true. Therefore, stigma comes from both own- and out-groups. The degree
of welfare stigma—being associated with a social norm—is plausibly endogenous
and dependent on how common welfare use is, as well as on group membership.
This mechanism is related to what Luttmer (2001) calls negative exposure effect
and racial group loyalty:7 while individuals tend to be unsupportive of welfare as
many people in the community are recipients, they tend to be supportive when they
belong to the same ethnic-racial group of the recipients themselves. Therefore, the
more individuals that are on welfare in the community, the less embarrassing it







that is decreasing in the welfare participation rates in both own- and
out-groups, respectively.
Therefore, while own-group is a source of both stigma and information, out-
groups are a source of stigma only. This will be our separating assumption. The
utility function over the participation choice is:
U (0) = w (1)
U (1) = T − I
³










5In a different context, Duﬂo and Saez (2003) ﬁnd that information that ultimately affects enroll-
ment in a retirement plan is shared within but not across departments.
6This social deﬁnition extends Mofﬁtt’s (1983) introspective deﬁnition of stigma (a negative self-
characterization due to lack of self-support).
7These are both equivalent to the ﬁnding of the research agenda on Social Identity Theory. For
example, Yanovitsky et al. (2006) test such patterns and ﬁnd similar support for these effects in their
study.
4An eligible individual uses welfare if and only if U (1) ≥ U (0).T h i sd e ﬁnes a
reservation wage, e w 
r, for each reference group, as the solution to the indifference
condition U (1) = U (0):
e w 
r = T − I
³










Anindividualworksifshecanearnat least e w 
r onthelabormarket, andchooses
welfare otherwise. Therefore, the equilibrium participation rates are deﬁn e db yt h e
















where F is the distribution of wages in the economy. An equilibrium in this model
is a set of reservation wages for each group and participation rates such that utility
is maximized. The equilibrium probability of welfare use, conditional on member-
ship in group ( ,r),i s














Since T is unobserved for individuals who could live on welfare but choose to
work instead, we use individual characteristics X to form a linear prediction for
this variable, T = kT + cX,w h e r ekT i sac o n s t a n t .N e x t ,w es p e c i f yI (.) and
S (.) as linear:
I
³
Ω ,m  
r
´




















where kI and kS are constants, α 
ρ is the demographic share of individuals of race-
ethnic group ρ, ρ 6= r, in community   and αr is the national share of race-ethnicity
r.
The rationale of equation (6) is intuitive: since m 
r can be regarded as the
probability of meeting an individual with whom one is associated and who can
pass information, JI
r is the information effect from own-group keeping information
from institutional sources, Ω , constant.
The total stigma function (7) is composed of two parts that generate the stigma
effect from own- and out-groups, JS
ro.T h eﬁrst part is again the own-group wel-
fare participation rate: the more likely an individual on welfare from own-group
is met, the less one feels stigmatized if she is also on welfare. The second part
aggregates single terms α 
ρm 
ρ which can be interpreted as the probability that a
5member of group r in area   meets a member of group ρ 6= r who is on welfare.
This is so because the probability of living in spatial proximity of an individual
from race-ethnicity ρ in location   is α 
ρ < 1. This interpretation justiﬁes two ap-
parent anomalies in equation (7). First, we don’t need to normalize the weights so
that they may sum to 1. Second, the own-group effect does not vary with the size
of the reference group, while the out-group effect does. This is a consequence of
the difference between spatial and social proximity. The two parts are weighted to
allow stigma from own-group and aggregate stigma from all out-groups to be sub-
stitutes at a rate different from one. We choose national shares αr and (1 − αr) as
weights because stigma based on race-ethnicity involves identities that are formed
at a higher level, where an individual sees herself, for instance, as member of a
national majority or minority. This is consistent with evidence from social psy-
chology: perceived afﬁliation with a racial or ethnic group is associated both with
particular beliefs and common behaviors, and the relative sizes of minority groups
affect perceptions and actions (Simon and Brown, 1987). We will show later in the
paper how these assumptions translate mechanically into estimates.8 Replacing (6)
and (7) into (5), collecting terms and deﬁning k ≡ kT + kI + kS, we obtain the
probability we wish to estimate:
















The equilibrium participation probability, equation (8), can be estimated using a
random cross-section of individuals. In order to control for group-level hetero-
geneity, we deﬁne vectors of group-level controls for race r across locations, Yr,
location  , Y  , and combination of race and location, Y  
r . These are collected into
vector Y ≡
¡
Yr Y   Y  
r
¢0. We allow for heterogeneity across race-ethnic groups by
estimating equation (8) separately for each group. We conduct our empirical inves-
tigation under the canonical linear-in-means model of Manski (1993), i.e. employ
a linear probability model:




o + εir ,( 9 )
8Technically, the use of weights that are constant across communities (while allowed to vary





roαr is the joint effect of stigma and information from own-





ρ, i.e. the relevant weighted average of out-groups’
participation rates. Thus, we are deﬁning JS
o ≡ JS
ro(1 − αr) as the stigma effect
from other race-ethnic groups. By analogy, we will denote with JS
r ≡ JS
roαr the








, but these are not separately identiﬁed in model (9). We refer
to this as the conﬂation problem9, the core focus of the current paper.
Of course identiﬁcation of social effects comes logically ﬁrst than separate
identiﬁcation, i.e. we must ﬁrst solve the reﬂection problem (Manski, 1993), which
potentially affects any linear model with social interactions. Equilibrium condition
(4) implies that the expected participation rate of an individual of race-ethnicity r
in community   is equal to the mathematical expectation of the individual partici-









This condition, coupled with equation (9), forms a system of simultaneous
equations. According to (10), m 
r depends only on the mean of individual charac-





,a n dY  







Y  |Y  
r
¢
= Y  
r .
Suppose, as is the case when one constructs contextual controls from individual
data, that the group-level controls, Y  
r , are the group-level mean of the individual





= Y  
r . Then, in absence of a restriction in
the form of an individual effect whose average is not a contextual effect, one can-
not identify the composite endogenous social effect JSI
r [see Brock and Durlauf
(2001)]. We provide a plausible restriction by combining two particular variables
in our dataset. First, a variable indicating “whether the respondent has any difﬁ-
culty learning, remembering, or concentrating, because of a physical, mental, or
emotional condition lasting 6 months or more.” (our italics) This variable reﬂects
both long-lasting impairments and subjective temporary conditions: for example a
person may have difﬁculty concentrating for afewmonths due todistress following
the death of a relative or because of transitory ﬁnancial problems. Second, a vari-
able indicating “whether respondents have any lasting physical or mental health
condition that causes difﬁculty working, limits the amount or type of work they
can do, or prevents them from working altogether. This does not include tempo-
rary health conditions.” (our italics). We create a new dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the value of the ﬁrst variable is 1 and the value of the second is 0. This way
we are isolating a temporary individual shock. The reason why this is important
when looking for a restriction is that contextual effects, by deﬁnition, do not reﬂect
9A term suggested to us by Giacomo Rondina.
7temporary subjective states. Contextual effects have to do with the structure of the
community; that is, with its objective characteristics. Therefore, while a tempo-
rary subjective state of distress might affect an individual’s propensity to apply for
welfare, the percentage of individuals who report such a subjective state is very
unlikely to be the source of any contextual effect.
An additional issue to be addressed is the selection problem. Although race
is an exogenous trait (which considerably mitigates this problem), individuals in
the sample chose to live in a particular area. If residential choices depend on un-
observables that also affect the probability of participating in welfare, then the
estimated social effects will be affected by selection bias. In our case, the issue is
the degree to which neighborhood choice is correlated with welfare participation
(beneﬁt shopping). Since welfare arrangements are constant across PUMAs within
a state, we believe the problem is a mild one here, except perhaps for a few cases at
borders between states with signiﬁcant differences in welfare beneﬁts [McKinnish
(2005)]. We provide later in the paper a test that conﬁrms this intuition: people
do not appear to move across PUMAs for reasons related to their decision to work
or participate in welfare. Therefore, like other empirical studies in social interac-
tions that use PUMAs as reference groups [e.g. Bertrand et al. (2000) and Luttmer
(2005)] we don’t need to be concerned with selection as a relevant source of bias.
Separate identiﬁcation of different social effects is achieved as follows. Equa-
tion(9), henceforth referred to astheprimary model, canalso be written as follows:










an equation we refer to as the auxiliary model. Here total stigma—the last RHS
term before the error—captures by construction all social effects that work within
and across race-ethnic groups in a certain location, but excludes social effects that
work exclusively within. This leaves out information sharing, whose effect is cap-
tured by the term JI
rm 
r.
Conditional on race, the auxiliary model does not involve new information,
because αr is a constant. Therefore, the corresponding regression models have
exactly the same errors.10 In other words, by construction primary and auxiliary
models are both “true models.” Consequently, we can compare the coefﬁcients of
different social effects across them. The two models imply (see the three identities
below equation (9)) that an estimator for the stigma effect from own-group r only,
JS
r ,i s :
10This is why we can denote the coefﬁcients on individual and contextual effects with the same





This isintuitive: since we can compare coefﬁcientsacross models, to obtain the
effect of stigma from race-ethnicity r only, one can subtract from the total stigma
effect the portion that does not come from this group. However the two models





whose interpretation is again straightforward: own group stigma is equal to total
social effects from own-group, net of the effect of information. Of course these
two estimators are equivalent. To see this, notice that the marginal effects of par-
ticipation rates from the primary and auxiliary regression equations, for own-group
r and any out-group ρ,a r e












o =( 1− αr)α 
ρJS
ro. (15)







and the second into (13) to get
JS
r = JS
ro − (1 − αr)JS
ro = αrJS
ro, (17)





as well as a useful speciﬁcation check: if our model is correctly speciﬁed, the
estimates obtained through (12), (13), and (18), should not be too dissimilar. As
we report below, in our sample, they provide very similar answers.
To summarize our discussion, if we denote with x the single excluded indi-
vidual effect, with superscript j its coefﬁcient and with i a vector of ones, we can
identify social effects separately by estimating the following reduced form equa-
tions,11









Ω  + crXi + cj
rxi +
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Ω  + crXi + cj
rxi +
JI





























+ εir , (20)
and then recover the social interactions coefﬁcients and their standard errors using
the delta method. Of course we cannot separately identify the coefﬁcients on the
composite variable Y ≡
¡
Yr Y   Y  
r
¢0, only their sum, dr ·i, is identiﬁed. Also, the
coefﬁcients on the individual controls have no obvious interpretation because we
have used these to form a linear prediction of the beneﬁts an individual is entitled
to. This is not important, because our goal is to identify separately stigma and








Overall, this strategy isolates information, that is non-preference-based social ef-









< (1,1,1,1). Our theoretical model predicts that both
JI
r, the information effect and JS
r and JS
o , the stigma effects from own- and out-
group, are positive.
What is the social multiplier, i.e. the cumulative effect of an exogenous shock,
implicit in this framework? Suppose that the individual probability of participating
in welfare for a certain race at the PUMA level decreases exogenously by 1 per-





¢−1. However, in the presence of cross-group stigma,
the other race-ethnic groups are also affected by the shock, which generates further
feedback effects. From equation (9) we can compute the initial reaction to the unit







r). The social multiplier
implied by our model is the reciprocal of one minus such a quantity, which can be
written as follows,
equations (9) and (11), using as contextual effects the means of all non-excluded individual effects,
solving for m
 




















r,w h e r eJS
o(ρ) is the cross-group coefﬁcient for race-ethnicity




¢−1.T h e 1 − JSI
r
component should be easily recognizable as the own-group effect. The ﬁnal term
is the portion of the shock that operates through out-groups. Therefore, the social
multiplier generatedbyour modelisspecial intworespects: (1)it isgroup-speciﬁc,
so that in general a given policy will impact race-ethnic groups differently; (2)
it depends on the initial participation rate, so that the effect of a certain policy
depends on initial conditions. We will later illustrate this fact with a numerical
simulation based on our estimates.
4D a t a s e t
We use data from the 2000 Census 5% PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample),
drawn from the IPUMS website at the University of Minnesota. Reference groups
are deﬁned as race-ethnic groups according to the US Census categories at the
PUMA level, the lowest level of aggregation available in PUMS. The national
weights we employ are computed from the 2000 National Census: 0.69 for White
Nonhispanic, 0.13 for Hispanic of all races, 0.12 for Black Nonhispanic, 0.04 for
Asian, 0.01 for Natives. The remaining race-ethnicities, Paciﬁc Islanders and Oth-
ers, have negligible weights and are not considered.12 For estimation, although we
consider all groups for the purpose of deﬁning out-groups, we will focus on the
three largest race-ethnic groups, at the PUMA level: Black Nonhispanic, Hispanic
of any race, and White Nonhispanic.
The dataset is constructed following Bertrand et al. (2000) closely. After ex-
cluding the institutional population, we restrict the sample to women between 15
and 55 years old. This captures only the working age population and avoids over-
lap with Social Security payments to those in older demographic brackets. It also
acknowledges the fact that welfare policy is targeted principally at families with
children, a demographic that almost universally includes women. Own-group ef-
fects are calculated as the sample average of the welfare participation variable of
individuals of the same race-ethnicity within a PUMA. Outgroups are the remain-
der of the population in the given PUMA. Contextual variables are estimated using
12Theremainingpart to100%consists of individualswhoindicate more thanonerace, for instance
both White Hispanic and Black. We do not consider these either.
11sample averages of individual variables, by race at the PUMA level.13 We also
included in the dataset the number of social workers in the state of residence per
thousand citizens, as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as well as the
minimum wage in the state of residence at the time our data were collected. The
number of social workers proxies for the theoretical variable Ω.14 Our ﬁnal sample
contains 462,259 Blacks, 479,608 Hispanic, 2,766,673 White nonhispanic, as well
as 265,166 individuals of other race-ethnicities, which are included in the compu-
tation of welfare participation rates. Thus, this study is based on a sample of about
four million individuals.
Table 2 lists the variables we use. Our indicator of welfare usage is a dummy
variable that is set equal to one if an individual receives transfers in the form of
public assistance income, excluding SSI (Supplemental Security Income), Earned
Income Tax Credit, as well as assistance from private charities.15 As shown, we
use a simple set of individual controls that appear to be relevant for the problem at
hand. The inclusion of the average of these individual effects—in addition to the
number of social workers and minimum wage—as contextual controls allows us to
capture most local effects. We also use squares of all these to obtain more ﬂexible
estimates. This makes a total of 110 regressors.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics. These show that the welfare participation
rates of Black, Hispanic, and White individuals in the sample are, respectively,
7.3%, 4.9% and 1.5%. Not surprisingly, individuals on welfare tend to be younger
(except for Hispanics), less educated, poorer, with more kids. There also appears
to be a very high concentration of individuals out of the labor force and single
mothers, with lower rates of ﬂuency in English (except for Blacks). Also notice
that the availability of social workers is higher in places where Whites live (1.98
perthousandpeople),comparedtoplaceswhereBlacks(1.84)andHispanics(1.71)
live.
13In order to assess how good this approximation is, note that of the four million individuals in
the sample, about 85,000, or roughly 2%, have fewer than 100 neighbors. When estimating our main
model without these individuals (results are available from the authors upon request) the estimated
coefﬁcients vary only marginally. Because of this, we work with the full sample because it is not
clear what the appropriate cutoff should be, i.e. 100 rather than 1000 or 10 neighbors in the sample.
14We use the 2005 BLS estimate, under the assumption that the number of social workers per
thousand citizens did not change dramatically since 2000. More speciﬁcally, we used the sum of
Social and Human Service Assistants (who provide support for families, assisting them identifying
and obtaining available beneﬁts and social and community services) and Child, Family, and School
Social Workers (who assist children, their families, and notably single parents).
15Note that some transfers, like food stamps, are effectively in-kind and may not be reported by
individuals as welfare assistance.
125 Results and checks
We estimated models (19)-(20) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and recovered
the structural coefﬁcients and standard errors using the delta method. Table 4 con-
tains our key results, namely the estimated social interactions coefﬁcients16.T h i s
table shows an interesting pattern. While the total social effect from own race-
ethnicity, JSI
r , is similar across the three groups (with a slightly larger coefﬁcient
for Blacks, row one), there are clear differences in its composition: information,
JI
r, rather than stigma, JS
r , is the predominant own-group effect for Blacks and
Hispanics (row three), while Whites, for whom the effect of information is statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero, are subject to a strong stigma effect from other
Whites(rowﬁve)relativetominorities—anorderofmagnitudelarger. Cross-group
social effects (row two) are not statistically different across the three main ethnic-
ities we consider, but while minorities are subject to a strong stigma effect from
other groups relative to own-group stigma, the opposite holds for Whites. To re-
late this to the race and ethnicity laden discussion of welfare participation, our
results suggest that Blacks’ and Hispanics’ decision to take up welfare is princi-
pally a function of socioeconomic features, group-level information sharing, and
the stigmatization effects of other races and/or ethnicities. Whites’ participation
decision, on the other hand, is mainly a function of own-group stigma among all
the possible social effects we considered. We ﬁnd these asymmetries to be note-
worthy. The last two rows of Table 4 report results of a simple speciﬁcation check
on our separation strategy. Namely, we computed the own-group stigma effect
that is implied by equations (12) and (13), to be compared with our estimate using
equation (18). There is some discrepancy, which is not surprising, but one of the
central patterns we uncover is quite robust: own-group stigma is very important for
Whites, but negligible for Blacks and Hispanics.
What is the effect of αr in equations (17)-(16) on these estimates? We gain
intuition into the mechanics of the model by re-estimating social effects as a func-
tion of αr for each group, keeping the sum of weights constant. We do this exercise
over the range where the distribution of population shares concentrates. Figure 1
illustrates. The solid line is the kernel density estimate (left scale) of the population
share of a given race-ethnic group across states. The group share, i.e. αr in our
model, is reported on the horizontal axis. We report on the same graph (right scale)
the social effect we would estimate using a particular level of αr. Our baseline esti-
mates are located by a dashed box. For the Black and Hispanic groups, our results
are substantially unaffected by a perturbation of the weight, while they seem to
vary faster with αr for Whites–a scale effect due to a large αr and a low participa-
16Full regression output is available from the authors upon request.
13tion rate for this group. The general pattern is that as αr increases, the importance
ofstigma alsoincreases and the importance ofinformationdecreases. This is tauto-
logical: as the relative importance of stigma from own-group increases, the stigma
effect must be larger, and consequently—given the total own-group effect—the im-
portance of information must decrease. Equation (5) makes this point clear. Over-
all, over the relevant range our results seem robust to perturbations of the national
weight we use.
In order to assess the quantitative implications of the social effects we estimate,
suppose there is a uniform exogenous decrease of 5% in the welfare rolls across
race-ethnic groups, with initial participation rates given by the sample means. Ta-
ble 5 shows the effect of such a shock on the equilibrium participation rates, using
the “overall” social multiplier deﬁned by equation (21). The implied cumulative
effect is a reduction of a quarter in the participation rate for Blacks (equivalent
to 1.78 percentage points), one seventh in the participation rate of Hispanic (0.71
percentage points) and one fourteenth in the participation rate of Whites (0.13 per-
centage points). These might be regarded as large numbers – especially for Blacks.
Yet, we believe this exercise makes a strong methodological point. In particular, it
turns out that the contribution of information to such reduction—given by the so-
cial multiplier in the case in which information is the only relevant social effect—is
very large for Blacks and Hispanics (almost 90%), but slightly more than a third
for Whites. The reduction in the participation rate of Whites is thus driven by own-
group stigma, with stigma from others groups practically negligible. On the other
hand, the reduction in the participation rate of minorities is driven by information.
The large difference in the social multiplier between Blacks and Hispanic is due to
the larger total social effect from own race-ethnicity for the former.17
Tables 6a-6c report estimates of the same social effects by race-ethnic group
and by education and income classes. We focus on low education (high school
dropoutsandhighschoolgraduates, respectively)andlowincome(incomeatorbe-
low the bottom 2 quintiles of the income distribution in our sample), where welfare
participation is more concentrated. These tables show further interesting patterns.
First, in agreement with intuition, information is more important for low-educated
people relative to the average, i.e. the coefﬁcients increase with respect to those in
Table 4. Second, and related to the ﬁrst point, there are virtually no differences in
the predominant role of information sharing for the very low educated, i.e. high
school dropouts, across race-ethnicities, while Table 4 reported marked differences
for the population at large. Third, for Blacks the effect of social interactions is es-
sentially invariant across the three dimensions we consider, suggesting, consistent
17The apparently small difference (0.1) is magniﬁed by multiplier effects: (1 − 0.7)
−1 =3 .33,
while (1 − 0.8)
−1 =5 .
14with Social Identity Theory, some effect of racial identity for this group.
Table 7 reports two pieces of evidence to support the claim that our results
are likely not impacted by selection into PUMAs. In column 1, we regress the
move decision on the panel of covariates used in the remainder of the study and
the welfare participation decision. The very large and negative coefﬁcient shows
that, after controlling for a variety of local and individual effects, there is a negative
relationship between welfare and mobility. That is, individual on welfare are much
less likely to move than others. Column 2 changes the focus slightly. We ﬁrst
restrict the sample only to movers and then assign a value of one to movers that
moved beyond a state line. Of course, since welfare rules are state-speciﬁc, beneﬁt
shopping is only effective with a cross-border move. We regress our new variable
on the same independent variables. The coefﬁcient on the welfare variable is
now indistinguishable from zero. Jointly, it suggests that welfare recipients are
less likely to have moved than the rest of the population, and, if they moved are
no more likely to have moved across state lines than within a state. As such, we
are conﬁdent that selection, if present, is sufﬁciently small that it will not impact
inference.
6 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have argued that when trying to estimate the effect of social in-
teractions on economic behavior, it may be important to explicitly address the fact
that different social effects, with different policy implications, are possibly at work.
We have illustrated a simple way to separately identify different effects, with an ap-
plication to welfare participation in the US. We have jointly estimated two social
effects. The ﬁrst is the effect of the welfare participation decisions of one’s own
race and ethnicity on individual decisions and the second is the joint effect of these
decisions and those of different races in the same local (PUMA) area. We ﬁnd
that the own-group effects are more salient overall, with some degree of instructive
heterogeneity. From this starting point, we argue that, using labels from social psy-
chology, [Campbell and Fairey (1989)] we can labeled such effects ‘information’
and ‘stigma.’
The result that information is the predominant social effect in welfare partic-
ipation is consistent with the ﬁndings of Heckman and Smith (2003) as well as
Aizer (2007) on the relevance of informational barriers in determining program
participation rates, as well as with the experimental evidence reported in Daponte
et al. (1999). On the other hand, our ﬁndings are apparently at odds with those of
Aizer and Currie (2004) about network effects in the use of publicly funded ma-
ternity services, based on panel data on ﬁrst and second pregnancies of a sample
15of women in California. Their main test of the information hypothesis is based
on the argument that if information is to be the predominant social effect then the
magnitude of total social effects must be smaller for second deliveries, which is not
the case in their dataset. We believe this result does not necessarily contrast with
ours, for two reasons. First, since in their sample ﬁrst and second deliveries are on
average three years apart, it may well be that information relative to ﬁrst delivery
is obsolete for many women in the sample. Second, and more importantly, our data
a r ec l o s et oam a j o rw e l f a r er e f o r mw h i c hmay have made information particularly
salient.
It is worth noting that the combination of different social effects is present
in other contexts. We mention three examples. One, consider students in a high
school setting in which information sharing through collective learning can con-
tribute to improved test scores. Many high school environments also include (of-
ten negative) stigma associated with good test performance [Akerlof and Kranton
(2002)]. Two, access to medical care in poor communities is often a patchwork
of public and private providers, a system that takes effort and understanding to
navigate. However, it’s been noted that access to care for individuals with HIV, de-
pression, obesity (and other illnesses) is associated with a social stigma [Herek et
al. (2002); Eisenberg et al. (2007)]. Three, much controversy surrounded the 2005
bankruptcy reform act. In particular, a debate emerged over the motivations for
declaring bankruptcy that again split down information and stigmatization lines.
Cohen-Cole and Duygan-Bump (2008) use a similar methodology as we have to
evaluate this question. We don’t opine here on the correct structuring of investiga-
tions into these issues, but mention them to illustrate that the welfare case is not
unique in needing evaluation of multiple drivers of social interactions. We argue
that this implies a need for methods of distinguishing the nature and composition
of the effects in each context.
Regardless of the labeling convention used, we think our investigation offers
important insights. In particular, it shows that different social effects may be at
work in welfare participation decisions, and that they operate differently across
race-ethnic groups. This in turn, is important to understand the working of welfare
and to evaluate alternative policies.
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18Table 1. Social Expenditure in OECD countries
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Australia 10.9 13.0 14.1 17.1 17.9 17.9
Belgium 23.5 26.1 25.0 26.4 25.3 26.5
Canada 14.1 17.3 18.4 19.2 16.7 17.3
Denmark 25.2 24.2 25.5 28.9 25.8 27.6
Finland 18.4 22.8 24.5 27.4 21.3 22.5
France 20.8 25.8 25.3 28.3 27.6 28.7
Germany 23.0 23.6 22.5 26.6 26.3 27.3
Greece 11.5 17.9 18.6 19.3 21.3 21.3
Ireland 16.8 21.8 15.5 16.3 13.6 15.9
Italy 18.0 20.8 19.9 19.8 23.2 24.2
Japan 10.3 11.2 11.2 13.9 16.1 17.7
Luxembourg 23.6 23.1 21.9 23.8 20.4 22.2
Netherlands 24.1 24.2 24.4 22.8 19.3 20.7
New Zealand 17.1 18.0 21.8 19.0 19.1 18.0
Portugal 10.8 11.0 13.7 18.1 20.2 23.5
Spain 15.5 17.8 20.0 21.5 20.4 20.3
Sweden 28.6 29.7 30.5 32.5 28.8 31.3
Switzerland 13.9 14.8 13.5 17.5 18.0 20.5
United Kingdom 16.6 19.6 17.2 20.4 19.1 20.6
United States 13.3 12.9 13.4 15.4 14.6 16.2
OECD - Total 15.9 17.6 17.9 19.9 19.4 20.7
Note. This table reports total (in cash and in kind) expenditure of general
government for social policy (health, pensions, unemployment, housing, family,
disability, etc.) as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD. As of August 2008, the
latest available year in the dataset is 2003.
19Table 2. Variables used
Variable Description
welfare: Welfare participation indicator
age: Age of individual
childpresent: Children present
nchild: Number of children present
nfamilies: Number of families in household
hsdropout: Educational attainment: high school droupout
hsgrad: Educational attainment: high school graduate
collegemor: Educational attainment: more than college
singlemother: Single mother





poorenglish: Poor English ﬂuency
unempl: Unemployed
nolabforce: Not in labor force
nophone: No phones present in household
income: Gross household income (including welfare)
poverty: Poverty indicator (income in % of poverty line)
workdisabl: Work disability
socworkers Social Workers per 1,000 citizens
statewage State minimum wage
temphealth Temporary negative health condition
Note. We use as controls these variables, their PUMA-level averages when
appropriate (contextual effects) as well as the squares of all these. This makes a
total of 110 controls.
20Table 3. Means of controls by race-ethnicity and welfare status
Black Hispanic White All
Welfare No Welf. Welfare No Welf. Welfare No Welf. Welfare No Welf.
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
age 33.35 34.52 33.57 32.36 34.27 36.34 33.85 35.43
c h i l d p r e s e n t0 . 7 40 . 5 00 . 7 70 . 5 50 . 6 70 . 4 80 . 7 20 . 4 9
nchild 1.76 0.95 1.96 1.18 1.33 0.89 1.67 0.94
nfamilies 1.20 1.18 1.32 1.30 1.32 1.17 1.28 1.19
hsdropout 0.41 0.24 0.63 0.46 0.31 0.14 0.44 0.20
hsgrad 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.24 0.31 0.24
somecollege 0.23 0.34 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.31
collegemore 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.29 0.04 0.25
s i n g l e m o t h e r 0 . 6 40 . 2 70 . 5 10 . 1 30 . 4 60 . 0 90 . 5 30 . 1 2
m a r r i e d s a b e n d 0 . 0 40 . 0 30 . 0 50 . 0 40 . 0 30 . 0 10 . 0 40 . 0 2
w i d o w e d 0 . 0 30 . 0 20 . 0 30 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 0 10 . 0 30 . 0 1
divorced 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.18 0.11
s e p a r a t e d 0 . 1 00 . 0 60 . 1 50 . 0 40 . 1 00 . 0 20 . 1 10 . 0 3
nevermarried 0.63 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.45 0.31
poorenglish 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.05
u n e m p l 0 . 1 80 . 0 60 . 1 30 . 0 60 . 1 00 . 0 30 . 1 30 . 0 4
n o l a b f o r c e 0 . 4 80 . 2 70 . 5 70 . 4 00 . 4 80 . 2 40 . 5 10 . 2 7
nophone 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.02
income 18,113 46,190 20,342 49,010 26,070 74,973 21,931 67,356
poverty 114.47 264.97 116.22 239.17 159.01 364.19 132.14 330.88
w o r k d i s a b l e0 . 1 70 . 1 50 . 1 60 . 1 30 . 2 20 . 0 80 . 1 80 . 1 0
socworkers 1.89 1.84 1.91 1.70 2.01 1.98 1.93 1.91
s t a t e w a g e 5 . 2 75 . 2 45 . 4 65 . 4 15 . 4 05 . 3 25 . 3 85 . 3 3
temphealth 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.02
Black Hispanic White All
Welfare 0.073 0.049 0.015 0.029
21Table 4. Estimates of Endogenous Social Effects
Social effect Coeff. Black Hispanic White
Stigma and Information from own group JSI
r 0.82*** 0.70*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Stigma from other groups JS
o 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Information (own group) JI
r 0.80*** 0.66*** 0.29
(0.04) (0.08) (0.23)
Stigma from own and other groups JS
ro 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.65***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.22)
Stigma from own group JS
r 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.45***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.15)
*: signiﬁcant at 5% – ***: signiﬁcant at 1% or better
Speciﬁcation Check:
JS
r implied by equation (18) 0.03 0.03 0.45
JS
r impled by equation (13) 0.02 0.04 0.43
JS
r impled by equation (12) 0.09 0.12 0.56
Note. This table reports estimates of the endogenous social effects considered
in our model. Reduced-form coefﬁcients are obtained by applying OLS to equa-
tions (19) and (20). Structural coefﬁcients and their standard errors are obtained
using the delta method. The dependent variable is the welfare participation indi-
cator. Individual controls are all the individual-level variables listed in Table 1,
as well as their squares. Contextual controls are the sample means (at the level
of PUMA and combination of PUMA and race-ethnicity) of the varibles listed in
Table 1 – except for temphealth which is our exclusion restriction – as well as their
squares. This makes a total of 110 (one hundred and ten) controls. Full regression
output is available from the authors upon request.
22Figure 1. Social effects as a function of αr
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23Table 5. Effect of a 5% uniform reduction in participation
Black Hispanic White
Initial participation rate 7.10% 4.80% 1.80%
Initial reduction in % 5% 5% 5%
Reduction in % points 0.36 0.24 0.09
Overall Social Multiplier 5.59 3.35 3.60
Multiplier of information 5.00 2.94 1.41
Total effect in % points 1.78 0.71 0.13
Final reduction in % 25.00% 14.71% 7.04%
Final participation rate 5.32% 4.09% 1.67%
Contribution of information 89% 88% 39%
Table 6a. Social effects at low levels of education and income
Black
Coeff. High School dropout High School degree Below 2nd income quintile
JSI
r 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.85***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
JS
o 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
JI
r 0.88*** 0.81*** 0.82***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
JS
ro 0.17*** 0.24* 0.23***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07)
JS
r 0.02*** 0.03* 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
*: signiﬁcant at 5% – ***: signiﬁcant at 1% or better
24Table 6b. Social effects at low levels of education and income
Hispanic
Coeff. High School dropout High School degree Below 2nd income quintile
JSI
r 0.81*** 0.68*** 0.77***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.07)
JS
o 0.10*** 0.18* 0.15***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.05)
JI
r 0.79*** 0.64*** 0.74***
(0.07) (0.16) (0.08)
JS
ro 0.19*** 0.32* 0.27***
(0.06) (0.16) (0.09)
JS
r 0.02*** 0.04* 0.03***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
*: signiﬁcant at 5% – ***: signiﬁcant at 1% or better
Table 6c. Social effects at low levels of education and income
White
Coeff. High School dropout High School degree Below 2nd income quintile
JSI
r 0.88*** 0.70*** 0.80***
(0.03) (0.11) (0.05)
JS
o 0.08*** 0.13* 0.11***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
JI
r 0.80*** 0.10 0.54***
(0.08) (0.91) (0.20)
JS
ro 0.34*** 1.10 0.76*
(0.13) (1.12) (0.33)
JS
r 0.24*** 0.76 0.52*
(0.09) (0.77) (0.23)
*: signiﬁcant at 5% – ***: signiﬁcant at 1% or better






*: signiﬁcant at 5% – ***: signiﬁcant at 1% or better
Note. In column 1, the dependent variable is the move decision. Column 2 assigns a
value of one to movers that moved beyond a state line and zero to individuals that moved
within a state. Non-movers are excluded from column 2. All covariates used in study are
include. Results are available on request.
26